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A REFUTATION OF ROWE'S CRITIQUE OF 
ANSELM'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Georges Dicker 
In William L. Rowe's "The Ontological Argument," an essay that appears in the most 
recent editions of Feinberg's Reason and Responsibility and as a chapter in Rowe's 
Philosophy of Religion, Rowe reconstructs Anselm's Proslogium II argument for the 
existence of God, surveys critically several standard objections to it, and presents an 
original critique. Although Rowe's reconstruction is perspicuous and his criticisms of the 
standard objections are judicious, his own critique, I argue, leaves Anselm's argument 
unscathed. I conclude with some programmatic remarks about what a more adequate 
critique of Anselm's argument should do. 
1. Introduction 
In William L. Rowe's "The Ontological Argument," an essay that appears in 
the most recent editions of Feinberg's Reason and Responsibility and as a chapter 
in Rowe's Philosophy of Religion, Rowe reconstructs Anselm's Proslogium II 
argument for the existence of God, surveys critically several standard objections 
to it, and offers an original critique. J My purpose in this paper is to refute Rowe's 
critique. Although Rowe's reconstruction of Anselm's argument is perspicuous 
and his criticisms of the standard objections are judicious, his own critique, as 
I shall try to show, leaves Anselm's argument unscathed. First I shall summarize 
Rowe's reconstruction. Then I shall analyze his critique, after which I shall 
argue that it fails. I shall end with some programmatic remarks about what a 
more adequate critique of Anselm's argument should do. 
2. Rowe's Reconstruction of Anselm's Argument 
Rowe prefaces his reconstruction by slightly simplifying Anselm's definition 
of God as "a being than which none greater can be conceived." To allow himself 
to use the singular term "God" to abbreviate Anselm's characterization, he 
replaces "a being" with "the being." And to avoid the psychological connotations 
of "than which none greater can be conceived," he substitutes the phrase "than 
which none greater is possible." Accordingly, Rowe uses the term "God" 
throughout his reconstruction as simply an abbreviation of its definiens, i.e., of 
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the longer phrase, "the being than which none greater is possible."2 
Rowe's reconstruction has three basic premisses: 
1. God exists (at least) in the understanding. 3 
2. God could exist in reality (God is a possible being.)' 
3. If X exists in the understanding but not in reality, and X could exist 
in reality, then X could be greater than it is. 5 
From these three premisses, Rowe reconstructs Anselm's reductio of the fool's 
denial that God exists, as follows: 
4. God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (assumption for 
reductio) 
5. God could be greater than He is. (from 2, 3, and 4) 
6. God is a being than which a greater is possible. (from 5) 
7. The being than which none greater is possible is a being than which 
a greater is possible. (by substituting the definiens of "God" for "God" 
in 6) 
8. It is not the case that: God exists in the understanding but not in 
reality. (from 4-7 by reductio ad absurdum) 
9. God exists in reality. (from I and 8)6 
Having so reconstructed Anselm's argument, Rowe successively examines the 
objections of Gaunilo, Kant, and C. D. Broad. Finding none ofthese compelling, 
he offers an original critique, to which I now tum. 
3. Rowe's Critique of Anselm 
To understand Rowe's critique, we need to note three concepts that he defines 
early in his essay: the concepts of an existing thing, a nonexisting thing, and a 
possible thing. Existing things are simply things that exist, such as the Empire 
State Building, dogs, and the planet Mars. Nonexisting things are things that do 
not exist, such as The Fountain of Youth, unicorns, and The Abominable Snow-
man. Possible things are things that, unlike round squares, are not impossible 
things.7 Rowe also puts forward an important principle that links the three con-
cepts: a possible thing must be either an existing thing or a nonexisting thing.8 
Having defined these notions, Rowe introduces his critique of Anselm by 
inviting us to consider a highly simplified version of the Ontological Argument. 
Its first premiss is a definition: 
i. God=df an existing, wholly perfect being. 
Its second premiss is the necessary truth that: 
ii. An existing, wholly perfect being cannot fail to exist. 
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Now, Rowe points out, all that follows from (i) and (ii) is that 
iii. No nonexisting thing is God. 
It does not follow, however, that 
iv. Some existing thing is God. 
Therefore, this simple ontological argument does not prove that God exists. 9 
Rowe believes that the same basic point can be made against Anselm's more 
complicated argument. Here is the key passage of his essay: 
The implications of these considerations for Anselm's ingenious argu-
ment can now be traced. Anselm conceives of God as a being than 
which none greater is possible. He then claims that existence is a great-
making quality and something that has it is greater than it would have 
been had it lacked existence. Clearly, then, no non-existing thing can 
exemplify Anselm's concept of God. For if we suppose that some 
non-existing thing exemplifies Anselm's concept of God and also sup-
pose that that non-existing thing might have existed in reality (is a 
possible thing) then we are supposing that that non-existing thing (1) 
might have been a greater thing, and (2) is, nevertheless, a thing than 
which a greater is not possible. Thus far Anselm's reasoning is, I believe, 
impeccable. But what follows from it? All that follows is that no non-
existing thing can be God (as Anselm conceives of God). All that follows 
is that given Anselm's concept of God, the proposition, "Some non-
existing thing is God," cannot be true ... What remains to be shown 
is that some existing thing exemplifies Anselm's concept of God. What 
really does follow from his reasoning is that the only thing that logically 
could exemplify his concept of God is something which actually exists. 
And this conclusion is not without interest. But from the mere fact that 
nothing but an existing thing could exemplify Anselm's concept of God, 
it does not follow that some existing thing actually does exemplify his 
concept of God . . .10 
What Rowe has done here is to go back through Anselm's argument, and to 
paraphrase it in accordance with the following schema: 
lao God =df the being than which none greater is possible." 
2. God could exist in reality (God is a possible being). 
3a. If X is a nonexisting thing and X could exist in reality (i.e. is a 
possible being), then X could be greater than it is. 
4a. Some nonexisting thing is God. (assumption for reductio) 
5. God could be greater than He is. (2, 3a, 4a) 
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6. God is a being than which a greater is possible. (5) 
7. The being than which none greater is possible is a being than which 
a greater is possible. (la, 6) 
8a. It is not the case that some nonexisting thing is God. (4a-7, reductio 
ad absurdum) 
Having so paraphrased Anselm's argument, Rowe directs his key point against 
it: While the reasoning is "impeccable," it fails to prove that God exists. For 
(8a) only says that no nonexisting thing is God; it does not say that some existing 
thing is God. In other words, (8a) is so to speak merely "negative information:" 
all it says is that a nonexisting thing cannot be God, cannot satisfy the definition 
or exemplify the concept of God-from which it doesn't follow that any (existing) 
thing does satisfy that definition or exemplify that concept. 
At this point, however, Rowe finds a "major difficulty" in his own critique. 12 
This difficulty stems from the principle linking possible, existing, and nonexisting 
things that we noted a moment ago. Suppose we add this principle to the argument: 
9a. If X is a possible thing, then X is either an existing thing or a 
nonexisting thing. 
The difficulty is that now the conclusion that God really exists follows, in just 
two easy steps: 
10. God is either an existing thing or a nonexisting thing. (2, 9a) 
11. God is an existing thing. (8a, 10) 
Nevertheless, Rowe does not believe that this difficulty defeats his critique. 
In the last episode of his essay, he raises a final objection to Anselm's argument-
one that he sees as "the solution to [the] major difficulty" just raised. 13 This final 
objection is that premiss (2)-the premiss that God could exist in reality, or is 
a possible being-in effect begs the question. 
To see why Rowe thinks that (2) begs the question, we need to appreciate 
two points. First, if we grant steps (1a)-(8a) of the above argument, then what 
we are granting, basically, is that it follows from the definition of God that no 
nonexisting thing can be God. Second, to accept Rowe's principle (9a) is to 
accept the idea that there is a class of all possible things, composed of existing 
things and nonexisting things. The consequence of these two points is that merely 
by placing God in the class of possible things, we are ipso facto placing Him 
among the existing things; i.e., that He exists. Rowe's example of a "magican" 
is helpful here. '4 Suppose that we define a "magican" as an existing magician, 
and accept principle (9a). Now suppose someone asks: is a magican a possible 
thing? Well, just by answering "yes," we would be saying that magicans exist. 
We would be saying that there really are people who possess the special charac-
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teristics (besides existence) required to be a magican; namely, the characteristics 
of magicians. But surely, one cannot so easily prove that such people exist! 
Likewise, Anselm's argument does not really prove that God exists. IS 
Rowe draws a moral from this final objection to Anselm. The moral is that 
one can have a coherent concept of something even if that concept does not pick 
out any possible object. For example, suppose that no magicians exist. Then the 
concept "magican"-an existing magician--does not pick out any possible object 
at all: it does not pick out a nonexisting object, since "magican" is defined as 
an existing magician; and it does not pick out an existing object, since there are 
no magicians. Yet, the concept of a magican is not self-contradictory (like the 
concept of a round square); it is perfectly coherent. 16 
4. Refutation of Rowe's Critique 
One may well have misgivings about Rowe's ontology of nonexisting things. 
To mention just a couple of odd consequences: suppose that today there are no 
magicians. Then a "magican" is not even a possible object, as we have seen. 
But surely a magician could begin to exist tomorrow, in which case (s)he would 
be an existing magician-i.e., a magican. So (a) a thing that is not possible is, 
nevertheless, one that can exist, and (b) a thing can be impossible at one time 
and possible at another. 
However, I shall not press the difficulties that arise from Rowe's postulation 
of nonexisting things. 17 Rather, I want to show that even given this postulation, 
his critique of Anselm's argument fails. It fails because in the course of his 
critique, Rowe changes Anselm's argument, and indeed deviates from his own 
reconstruction of the argument. But when the parts of the argument that Rowe 
changes are restored, it escapes his critique. Let me now support these claims. 
Recall how Anselm states the assumption for reductio. He does not state it 
as "some nonexisting thing is God." Rather, he states it as: "God exists only in 
the understanding;" or, equivalently and on the model of Rowe's own reconstruc-
tion, "God exists in the understanding but not in reality." In order to determine 
whether Rowe's basic objection damages Anselm's argument, then, we must 
see whether the objection still holds when the assumption for reductio is formu-
lated in this manner. Let us therefore recast the argument as follows: 
la. God =df the being than which none greater is possible. 
2. God could exist in reality (God is a possible being). 
3. If X exists in the understanding but not in reality, and X could 
exist in reality, then X could be greater than it is. 
4b. Something that exists in the understanding but not in reality is God. 
[Regiment as: "There is an x such that x exists in the understanding and 
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x does not exist in reality, and x is identical with God."] (assumption 
for Reductio) 
5. God could be greater than He is. (2, 3, 4b) 
6. God is a being than which a greater is possible. (5) 
7. The being than which none greater is possible is a being than which 
a greater is possible. (la, 6) 
8b. It is not the case that: something that exists in the understanding 
but not in reality is God. [Regiment as negation of regimentation of 
(4b)] (4b-7, reductio ad absurdum) 
At this point, it may seem that Rowe's basic objection to Anselm still holds. 
For the only point established in (8b) is that nothing that exists in the under-
standing but not in reality is God. It does not follow that something that exists 
in reality (or exists both in the understanding and in reality) is God. Line (8b), 
like line (8a) in the previous argument, is only "negative information." It merely 
says that a thing that exists only in the understanding cannot be God, does not 
satisfy the definition or exemplify the concept of God-from which it doesn't 
follow that anything does satisfy that definition or exemplify that concept. 
However, the last argument is still not equivalent to Anselm's. For it omits 
Anselm's premiss that God exists in the understanding. But this premiss-the 
very first one in Rowe's own reconstruction-is essential to Anselm's argument! 
As Rowe himself indicates, Anselm takes pains to justify the premiss. 18 The 
argument that results when the premiss is omitted is just not Anselm's. 
What happens when the premiss is restored? The answer is that the argument 
becomes valid. To see this, we need only supply the omitted premiss: 
9b. Something that exists (at least) in the understanding is God. [Regi-
ment as: "There is an x such that x exists in the understanding, and x 
is identical with God."] 
It now follows from (8b) and (9b) that: 
lOa. Something that exists in reality is God. [Regiment as: "There is 
anx such that x exists in reality, andx is identical with God."] (Q. E. D.) 
A simpler way to formulate the last three lines, using Descartes's borrowed 
notion of existing "objectively" (i.e., as an object of thought) would be: 
8c. It is not the case that something that exists objectively but not really 
is God. 
9c. Something that exists objectively is God. 
lOb. Something that exists really is God. (8c, 9c) 
Either way, the validity of the argument's final step can be proved in first-order 
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logic: from "- (3x) [(Ux . -Rx) . (x = a)]" and "(3x) [Ux . (x = a)]." one 
can derive "(3x) [Rx . (x = a)],"19 On the other hand, if we try to formulate the 
argument without premiss (9b) or (9c), then (lOa) and (lOb) cannot be derived. 20 
Therefore, this premiss is essential to the logic of Anselm's argument. 
But what of Rowe's last point-that premiss (2) ("God could exist in reality") 
in effect begs the question? Rowe might say that even if my refutation of his 
fundamental criticism is correct, his final objection stilI holds, because Anselm 
is still committed also to lines (3a), (8a), and (9a) of the argument given in 
section 3, so that so long as he affirms (2), he is virtually asserting that God 
exists. So the mere use of (2) in effect begs the question. 
The answer to this objection is that one need not interpret (2) to mean 
(2a) God is a possible thing. 
Rather, one can interpret (2) to mean: 
(2b) It is not self-contradictory to assert that God exists. 
Of course, (3) must then be understood as meaning: 
(3b) If X exists in the understanding but not in reality, and it is not 
self-contradictory to assert that X exists (in reality), then X could be 
greater than it is. 
These interpretations of premisses (2) and (3) seem to be ones that Anselm could 
easily live with. 
Rowe cannot simply reply that (2b) entails (2a). For such an entailment would 
rest on the principle that 
12. If it is not self-contradictory to assert that X exists, then X is a 
possible thing. 
But (12), together with other elements of Rowe's position, leads to a paradox. 
For suppose that there happen to be no magicians. We have already seen that 
this supposition, together with the definition of a "magican" as "an existing 
magician," implies that 
l3. No existing thing is a magican and no nonexisting thing is a magican. 
But (13), together with Rowe's principle (9a)-that if X is a possible thing, then 
X is either an existing thing or a nonexisting thing--entails that 
14. A magican is not a possible thing. 
Now it follows from (12) and (l4) that 
15. It is self-contradictory to assert that a magican exists. 
But surely, this is an absurd result: it means that in a magicianless universe, 
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"magi cans exist" is a self-contradictory statement. 
There appear to be only two ways that Rowe can avoid this paradox. One 
way is to deny (12). This is in effect the course that Rowe takes, since, as we 
have seen, he insists that a coherent (=non self-contradictory) concept need not 
pick out any possible object. But once (12) is denied, there is no basis for saying 
that (2b) entails (2a); so Anselm can avoid Rowe's charge of circularity by 
interpreting premiss (2) as (2b). The other way would be for Rowe to give up 
his principle (9a). Notice that this would not require denying the necessary truth 
that if X is a possible thing (=if it is possible that X exists), then either X exists 
or X does not exist. I suspect that Rowe's espousal of (9a) may reflect a failure 
to distinguish it clearly from this necessary truth. But be that as it may, giving 
up (9a) avoids the paradox, because (14) cannot be derived without (9a). Now 
it seems to me that this is by far the better way to avoid the paradox, since the 
denial of (12) has nothing to recommend it. But I need not insist on this point 
for present purposes. I need only point out that if Rowe denies (9a), then his 
charge of circularity is undermined. For only if (9a) is assumed does it follow 
that, since God cannot be a nonexisting thing, asserting that He is a possible 
thing is tantamount to asserting that He exists. Therefore, whether Rowe avoids 
the paradox by denying (12) or by giving up (9a), his final criticism of Anselm 
fails. 
5. Conclusion: Some Programmatic Remarks 
The moral I wish to draw from my refutation of Rowe's critique is that 
Anselm's premiss that God exists in the understanding is crucial to his argument. 
One way to refute that argument, accordingly, would be to refute this premiss. 
Anselm believes that one must accept the premiss in order even to deny the 
existence of God. For he takes the statement, "God does not exist," to mean, 
"God exists in the understanding but not in reality," which entails that God exists 
in the understanding. So, Anselm thinks, the fool must accept the premiss because 
it follows from his very denial of God. 
But what if Anselm is wrong in thinking that "God does not exist" means 
"God exists only in the understanding?" What if, as many philosophers now 
hold, the fool's denial means something like "the concept of God is not 
exemplified" or "The term 'God' does not apply to anything?" Then Anselm's 
argument collapses, for not only is the premiss that God exists in the understanding 
simply false, but the "assumption for reductio" can no longer generate a contradic-
tion. 21 
Anselm, however, has a reason for interpreting "God does not exist" as "God 
exists in the understanding but not in reality;" namely, his view that "whatever 
is understood, exists in the understanding."22 Now there is a philosophical question 
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that motivates this view: What makes a person's thought of (say) the Taj Mahal 
a thought of or about the Taj Mahal? Although I feel quite sure that this question 
can be satisfactorily answered without resorting to the notion that the Taj Mahal 
exists "in the person's understanding," this is not to say that I am prepared to 
give such an answer. Yet a definitive refutation of Anselm's premiss, I suggest, 
requires an answer. Pending that, the strongest objection that can be made to 
the premiss is that it uncritically assumes that merely intentional objects exist-at 
least in the understanding. 23 
State University of New York at Brockport 
NOTES 
I. All page references to Rowe's essay will be to its latest reprinting in Joel Feinberg (ed.), Reason 
and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, Sixth Edition (Belmont, Califor-
nia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 8-17, and will be given simply as "Rowe, p.---." 
The essay previously appeared as Chapter III of William L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: An 
Introduction (Belmont, California: Dickenson, 1978), and in the 3rd (1975), 4th (1978), and 5th 
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2. Rowe, p. 10, p. 17 note 3. It is doubtful that Rowe's substitution of "the" for "a" constitutes 
any modification of Anselm's own definition. For in Proslogium II, Anselm twice characterizes God 
as "that, than which nothing greater can be conceived" (my emphasis). 
3. Rowe, p. 10. I have added the parenthetical "at least." 
4. Rowe, p. 10. Rowe words this premiss as "God might have existed in reality (God is a possible 
being)." I shall also use "could exist in reality" rather than Rowe's "might have existed in reality" 
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5. Rowe, p. 10. Rowe words this premiss as "If something exists only in the understanding and 
might have existed in reality, then it might have been greater than it is." But he explains that "exists 
only in the understanding" is short for "exists in the understanding but not in reality" (p. 9). I have 
substituted the longer phrase for the shorter one, and used "X" instead of "something," here and 
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6. Rowe words this conclusion, following Anselm, as "God exists in reality as well as in the 
understanding." I have nevertheless omitted the conjunct, "in the understanding," since it is merely 
a repetition of premiss (I). 
7. Rowe, p. 9. 
8. Rowe, p. IS, p. 16. 
9. Rowe, p. 14. 
10. Rowe, pp. 14-15. 
II. I continue to use "the being" rather than "a being." 
12. Rowe, p. IS. 
13. Rowe, p. IS. 
14. Rowe, pp. 14-15. 
IS. Rowe, p. 16. 
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16. Rowe, p. 15. 
17. Some of these consequences are brought out by Clement Dore in "Descartes's Meditation V 
Proof of God's Existence," pp. 155-56 and p. 160, note 9. In Alfred 1. Freddoso (ed.), The Existence 
and Nature of God (Notre Dame and London: Notre Dame University Press, 1983), pp. 143-60. 
18. Rowe, p. 9. 
19. A derivation can be given as follows: 
(1) (3x) [lUx '(x = a)] 
(2) -(3x) [(Ux' -Rx)' (x = a)] 
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(3), S 
(10), (II), DN, DS 
(II), (12). Conj. 
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20. A formulation that omits this premiss can be given as follows: 
la. God =dfthe being than which none greater is possible. 
2. God could exist in reality. 
3c. If X does not exist in reality but X could exist in reality, then X could be greater than it is. 
4c. God does not exist in reality. (assumption for reductio) 
5. God could be greater than He is. (2, 3c, 4c) 
6. God is a being than which a greater is possible. (5) 
7. The being than which none greater is possible is a being than which a greater is possible. (1 a, 6) 
8d. It is not the case that God does not exist in reality. (4c-7, reductio ad absurdum) 
It may seem that since (8d) is equivalent by double negation to "God exists in reality," Anselm's 
conclusion does follow. But this is not so. For "God exists in reality" to entail that God actually 
exists, it must of course mean not just (a) "nothing that fails to exist in reality is God," but (b) 
"something that exists in reality is God." Now since (4c) is properly regimented as "(3x) [-Rx . 
(x = a)]," (8d) must be regimented as "- (3x) [-Rx . (x = a)]." But the latter is equivalent to 
"(x) - [(x = a) . Rx)]," which asserts (a) rather than (b). For (b) to follow, the premiss that God 
exists in the understanding-i.e., that (3x) lUx . (x = all-must be added, and (3c) expanded to 
read (3) "If X exists in the understanding but not in reality, and X could exist in reality, then X 
could be greater than it is." Then (b) can be derived, because "(3x) lUx . (x = a)]" and "-(3x) 
[-Rx . (x = a)]" entail "-(3x) [tUx . -Rx) . (x = a)]," which, together with "(3x) lUx . (x = 
a)]. entails "(3x) [Rx . (x =a)]" (as shown in note 19), which asserts (b). 
2 1. This crucial point was originally brought to my attention by Gareth Matthews in a lecture he 
presented at Mt. Holyoke College in 1981. 
22. Rowe, p. 9. Cf. Anselm, Proslogium TT, In Feinberg, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
23. I am grateful to Richard Feldman, Earl Conee, RalfMeerbote, and Paul Weirich for a stimulating 
and helpful discussion of the issues in this paper. 
